In human problem solving, there is a wide variation between individuals in problem solution time and success rate, regardless of whether or not this problem solving involves insight. In this paper, we apply computational and parameterized analysis to a plausible formalization of extended representation change theory (eRCT), an integration of problem solving by problem space search and insight as problem restructuring which proposes that this variation may be explainable by individuals having different problem representations and search heuristic choices. Our analyses establish not only the intractability of eRCT in general, but also sets of restrictions under which eRCT-based problem solving can and cannot be done quickly. As such, our analyses both prove that several conjectures about what makes problem solving under eRCT possible in practice are incomplete, in the sense that not all factors in the model whose restriction is responsible for efficient solvability are part of the explanation, and provide several new explanations that are complete.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of human problem solving can be accounted for by Newell and Simon's classic problem space search model (Newell & Simon, 1972) . This model underlies many subsequent and current models of human problem solving (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014; Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002) . In this model, a representation of a problem's givens and goals is chosen based on previous experience and search is then performed (possibly aided by heuristics) within the space of problem states associated with this representation until a state is encountered that satisfies the problem's goals, i.e., a goal state. This assumes that the representation initially chosen for the given problem is correct, in that it has goal states that can be reached by search within that representation's problem-state space. If this is not so, i.e., an impasse is encountered, restructurings (also known as insights) are necessary to modify the initial representation such that search can progress and possibly succeed (Ohlsson, 1992 ).
There are many types of problems that typically require insight to solve them, ranging from simple puzzles to complex word problems (see MacGregor and Cunningham (2009) and references therein). A basic type of such problems is the matchstick arithmetic problems (Knoblich et al., 1999) , in which matchsticks are arranged in simple mathematical formulas stated in terms of Roman numerals. The goal is to move one or more matchsticks to convert a given incorrect formula into a correct formula. To solve such problems, previous experience working with mathematical formulas must be overridden in various ways, with each such overriding corresponding to an insight. Several matchstick arithmetic problems and their solutions are shown in Figure 1 .
Experimental research on problem solving is typically divided into two camps, depending on whether or not the problems examined do or do not require insight to solve them (the so-called move and insight problems, respectively). There is great variation between individuals in how long it takes them to solve given problems or even if they can solve these problems at all (Newell & Simon, 1972; Ohlsson, 2011) , with the most marked variation seen in insight problems (Chu & MacGregor, 2011; Danek, Wiley, & Ollinger, 2016) . Hypothesized causes of this variation in move and insight problems are many and vary from the problem-specific (e.g., Kershaw & Ohlsson. 2004) to the general (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Batchelder & Alexander, 2011; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Ohlsson, 2011; Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009; Ormerod et al., 2002 ).
An explanation of particular interest in this paper is the different ways in which individuals represent and/or process problems (Öllinger et al., 2014) . These different ways are thought to arise from the differing prior experience of individual problem solvers (Batchelder & Alexander, 2011; Ohlsson, 2011) . This explanation, if correct, would have wide-reaching implications, including the abolition of the traditional distinction between move and insight problems: … [T] here is no particular class of insight problems that necessarily requires a representational change; each problem can be solved without insight if the initial problem representation is adequate and the appropriate heuristics are available. (Ollinger et al., 2014, p. 267) Untangling the effects of problem representation and processing on problem solution time and success using human experiments is notoriously difficult, especially in cases involv ing insight (Ash, Cushen, & Wiley, 2009; Batchelder & Alexander, 2011; Ohlsson, 2011) . A potential aid in this endeavor would be ideal observer models-that is, one or more algorithms (possibly based on different restrictions on representations and/or processing) "that can explore the entire problem space and determine sequences of moves that lead from the starting state toward a goal state that minimizes a cost function such as the number of moves" (Batchelder & Alexander, 2011, p. 81) . Such models would not only provide optimal-behavior baselines for comparison against human behavior (Batchelder & Alexander, 2011, p. 81) but would also illustrate (1) what factors can and cannot interact in individual human problem solvers to affect problem solution times and rates of success as well as (2) how such interaction might take place within a viable model of human problem solving.
In this paper, we will explore the space of possible ideal observer models for extended representation change theory (eRCT) (Öllinger et al., 2014) , a theory that gives an integrated treatment of problem solving by both problem space search and insight. We shall do this in two stages-we will first formalize a plausible computational-level model of eRCT and then analyze this model using techniques from both classical (Garey & Johnson, 1979) and parameterized (Downey & Fellows, 1999) computational complexity to establish not only the intractability of this model in general but also those sets of restrictions under which efficient eRCT-based problem solving is and is not possible (with the former corresponding to sets of restrictions defining distinct classes of viable ideal observer models). As such, our analyses will both prove that several conjectured explanations of what makes problem solving under eRCT possible in practice are incomplete, in the sense that all factors in the model whose restriction are responsible for efficient solvability are not part of the explanation, and provide several new explanations that can be formally proven to be complete.
OVERVIEW
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a framework for using computational and Knoblich et al. (1999) . The moved matchstick is indicated by increased thickness.
parameterized complexity analysis to evaluate the tractability and completeness of explanations of the solvability of problems under eRCT. Section 3 presents a computational-level model of problem solving under eRCT. Section 4 contains our computational complexity results, whose implications are discussed in Section 5. All mathematical definitions and proofs of results are given in Appendix A; this is to allow focus in the body of the paper on the model formulations and the implication of results derived for these models rather than the formal particulars of same. Finally, in Section 6, we give our conclusions.
A METHODOLOGY FOR VALIDATING EXPLANATIONS OF TRACTABILITY
Recall that our aim in this paper is to explore the space of viable ideal observer models for problem solving under eRCT, as an aid to both deriving algorithms for eRCT and assessing the validity (in terms of completeness) of conjectured explanations of the tractability of problem solving under eRCT. As answering these questions involves issues of the existence of particular types of algorithms implementing a cognitive theory, we will focus our analysis on Marr's computational level (Marr, 1981) . That is, our analyses will pertain to the input-output mappings postulated in such a theory to explain the target cognitive processes.
We first explain what we understand as a failure of a theory to explain the observed speed of some cognitive process. A computational-level theory ψ : I → O is said to fail to explain the speed (minimally, the tractability) of a given (or any) cognitive (sub)process if there exists no efficient algorithm for tractably computing the function ψ. For example, algorithms whose running times are superpolynomial in the size of the input representations are generally inefficient for all but small input sizes. Such algorithms require an amount of time which cannot be upperbounded by any polynomial function n c (where n is a measure of the input size and c is some constant). Examples are exponential-time algorithms, which require time that can (at best) be upperbounded by some exponential function c n . To see that, for instance, exponential-time algorithms are impractical on even medium sized inputs, consider that 2 n is already more than the number of seconds in a year for n = 25.
As we will show, the eRCT of problem solving has the property that all algorithms for computing it have running times that are superpolynomial (i.e., exponential or worse) in the input size (for proofs refer to Section A.3 in Appendix A). Note that in problem solving, input size cannot generally be assumed to be small, as our knowledge of different problems can be quite rich and encoding such knowledge may lead to quite large representations overall. This means that an eRCTbased computational-level model of problem solving cannot by itself explain the tractability of the problem solving process; in fact, the very formulations of these models seem to contradict observed instances of efficient human problem solving.
The above does nonetheless allow that instances of efficient human problem solving under eRCT can be explained by enriching eRCT with some constraints. To identify such constraints, we will use techniques to prove fixed-parameter tractability of a function ψ for one or more parameters of inputs in I (see also Downey and Fellows, 1999 In other words, a function is fp-tractable for a parameter set K if all superpolynomial-time complexity inherent in computing the function can be confined to the parameters in K. It then follows from the definition of fp tractability that if an intractable function ψ is fp-tractable for parameter set K then ψ can be efficiently computed even for large inputs, provided that function f() in the runtime bound is wellbehaved, e.g., 1.2
, and all the parameters in K are small. This means that if ψ is postulated as an explanation of the functional form of the input-output mapping computed by a given process, then the speed of that process in certain situations can be explained by postulating that the parameters in K are small exactly in those situations.
Given the above, we can explore the space of viable ideal observer models for eRCT relative to a set of possible constraints (each defined relative to a parameter of eRCT) by establishing the fp status of a computational-level model of eRCT relative to various combinations of these constraints. An fp-intractability result relative to a set K implies that there is no algorithm whose tractability is a function of K. Conversely, an fp-tractability result relative to K implies that there is at least one such algorithm. Note that each such K corresponds to a distinct class of cognitive mechanisms for efficiently implementing eRCT (namely, those cognitive mechanisms that can exploit restricted values of the parameters in K to lower their runtimes). Moreover, the algorithm originally used to establish fp tractability relative to K need not itself be a viable cognitive mechanism (as the algorithm only establishes fp tractability relative to K and thus need not be cognitively plausible or have the best possible runtime relative to K). Hence, in this paper, we focus on fp tractability relative to parameters, and must leave discussions of the effects of particular parameter values on runtimes to subsequent cognitive-algorithm-focused research.
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The above also allows us to distinguish between complete and incomplete explanations of the tractability of a function ψ such as a computational-level model of eRCT. This is a consequence of the following.
Observation 2. There exist functions ψ, and parameter sets K′, K, such that K′ ⊂ K and ψ is fp-tractable for K but not for K′.
This observation implies that there are input constraints (e.g., all parameters in K′ are small) that by themselves cannot explain the tractability of a cognitive process modelled by a function ψ but are yet part of such an explanation. In such cases we would say the assumption that all parameters K′ are small for the relevant situation is an incomplete explanation of the tractability of the process, whereas replacing K′ by K yields a complete explanation. Hence, a conjectured explanation of the tractability of human problem solving under eRCT that invokes a set of constraints K is complete if and only if eRCT is fp-tractable relative to the parameters underlying K. 
FORMALIZING EXTENDED REPRESENTATION CHANGE THEORY

EXTENDED REPRESENTATION CHANGE THEORY
The eRCT of Öllinger et al. (2014) is based on the representation change theory (RCT) of Knoblich et al. (1999) . Thus, in this subsection, we shall first explain RCT and then describe how eRCT extends RCT.
RCT builds on and extends the problem-restructuring account of insight-based problem solving proposed by Ohlsson (1992) . In RCT, a problem representation consists of a structure encoding a problem state, a set of search operators that can transform the problem state, and a set of one or more constraints that encode both restrictions on the search process and the characteristics of those problem states that are goal states.
3 The entities comprising a problem state are grouped into chunks, where each chunk corresponds to a pattern that has proven useful in previous instances of problem solving. Chunks may be nested or intersect, but at any given time, only one set of chunks (whose members are not nested) is considered active. Search operators are restricted to manipulating whole active chunks. RCT envisions two representation restructuring operations, namely the removal of a particular constraint on the search process or the form of a goal state (constraint relaxation) or the replacement of an active chunk by its immediately-nested chunks (chunk decomposition).
A classic experimental paradigm for testing RCT is matchstick arithmetic problems. Here, the problem representation consists of a structure which represents the arrangement of matchsticks at three levels (individual numbers, functional terms, and formulas) such that there are chunks for individual matchsticks and the groupings of matchsticks into Roman numeral components (I, V, X), Roman numerals proper (e.g., III, VI, IX), and mathematical operators (+, −, =). In addition to the constraints defining valid formulas are constraints derived from common mathematical knowledge that restrict the matchstick-movement search process (Knoblich et al., 1999, p. 
where f is addition, subtraction, or some other arithmetic function, because their purpose is to specify a calculation to be performed. Tautological statements of the general form X = X are meaningless. (They have their uses in more advanced mathematics, e.g., as starting points for proofs, but not in elementary arithmetic.) Each search operator can move a matchstick-chunk from one point in the problem state to another, possibly changing the orientation of that matchstick in the process. In order to invoke such an operator, the appropriate constraints must be relaxed and the appropriate chunks must be decomposed. The various search and restructuring operators that must be applied to give solutions to the example problems given in Figure 1 are shown in Figure 2 .
As described above, RCT focuses primarily on the representation change associated with insight. The new aspect added in eRCT is an integration of classical Newell-Simon problem space search, such that "…problem solving is conceptualized as a dynamic search process that might include recursive steps, that is, repeated instances of search, impasse, and representational change" (Danek et al., 2016, p. 2) . Note that in eRCT, as in RCT and its underlying ideas in Ohlsson (1992) , insights may be false-it is only required that insights make further search possible, not that such search will lead to a solution.
A COMPUTATIONAL-LEVEL MODEL OF eRCT
A computational-level model of problem solving under eRCT is based on and must therefore provide formal descriptions of the following entities and mechanisms:
1. Problem representations (which encode problem states). 2. Search operators (which alter problem states).
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3. Constraints (which encode both the forms of goal states and restrictions on the applications of search operators). 4. Restructuring operators (which alter problem representations). In this subsection, we will give an informal description of a plausible (in terms of a basic) formalization of these entities and mechanisms as well as the input-output mapping based on these entities and mechanisms that encodes the process of problem solving under eRCT. Full details of this formalization are given in Section A.1 in Appendix A.
Within eRCT, a problem representation consists of a collection of entities and their relationships, a collection of chunks imposed on this collection, i.e., a chunk-structure, and a subset of those chunks comprising the currently active chunks. A basic model of entities and their relationships is a predicate-structure, a popular type of representation in cognitive 
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Processing in Problem Solving Involving Insight science and artificial intelligence. A predicate-structure is composed of objects, e.g., sun, planet, and predicates relating those objects (as well as other predicates), e.g., Attracts (sun, planet), Cause(Gravity(Mass(sun)), Attracts(sun, planet)). Predicate-structures are naturally represented as vertex-labelled directed acyclic graphs in which objects are leaves, predicates are internal vertices, and each predicate is linked to its arguments by arcs that are directed from the predicate to those arguments (see Figure 3(a) ).
Modeling chunk-structures is more difficult, as there are no models of chunk-structures in the cognitive science literature (Knoblich et al., 1999 (Knoblich et al., , p. 1536 . A satisfactory model must have the following properties which are commonly imputed to chunks and chunk-structures (Simon, 1974 ; see also Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995) :
• A chunk is a portion of the problem state which corresponds to a unit recognized as useful in previous problem solving experience. 
T. Wareham Processing in Problem Solving Involving Insight
• Chunks can be of arbitrary size.
• Chunks may overlap or be nested. At any given time, a problem state is decomposed into and covered by a collection of possibly overlapping but nonnested chunks corresponding to the currently active chunks; moreover, the number of chunks in such a chunk-structure is relatively small, e.g., 7 ± 2.
We will model chunks as sub-predicate-structures, i.e., a subset of the objects in a predicate-structure and all relationships in that structure that are based on the objects in this subset. Such sub-predicate-structures can have arbitrary size, overlap, or be nested inside each other.
Moreover, this gives a natural specification of a chunk-structure as any non-nested collection of chunks that covers all objects (though not necessarily all predicates) in a predicate-structure. An example of such a problem representation for the matchstick arithmetic problem in Figure 1 (d) is given in Figure 3 (a). Note that there may be more than one instance of the same type of chunk in a problem representation, e.g., the individual matchstick chunks in part Figure 3(a) ; hence, we will distinguish between the set T of chunk types available for making chunk-structures and the individual chunk-instances making up a chunk-structure D relative to a particular problem representation.
We will model search operators as substructure replacement rules of the form X → Y that operate on predicate-structures. An application of such a rule to a predicate-structure p replaces one occurrence of predicate-substructure X in p with predicate-structure Y. As search operators can only manipulate active chunks in the chunk-structure of a predicatestructure, X and Y are phrased in terms of and hence can only move chunks in the chunk-structure of X or add, delete, or modify predicates in the structure linking chunks in, but not contained in, the chunk-structure of X. Example search operators that convert a plus sign into an equals sign and move a vertical matchstick to change a plus sign to a minus sign are given in Figure 3(b,c) .
We will model constraints as formulas in a suitably rich form of logic which operate over the objects, predicates, and chunks in a problem representation. We will also recognize these constraints as being in two sets C G and C O , with C G specifying the form of goal states and C O specifying restrictions in the application of search operators to a problem state. Both of these sets of constraints are effectively AND-ed internally, such that a problem state is a solution if and only if it satisfies all constraints in C G and the application of a search operator is valid if and only if this application does not violate any constraint, i.e., satisfies all constraints, in C O .
Finally, we will model the constraint relaxation operator as the deletion of one constraint in C = C G ∪ C O and the chunk decomposition operator as the replacement of a chunk x in the chunk-structure by one or more non-overlapping chunks that are nested inside and collectively cover all objects in x. The sequence of chunk decomposition and search operators required to solve the matchstick arithmetic problem in Figure 1(b) is shown in Figure 4 .
Given the above, we can now specify the input-output mapping that corresponds to the process of problem solving under eRCT. In human problem solving, this process can involve multiple impasses, which in turn require multiple rounds of restructuring followed by further search. This is specified as follows: Note that we explicitly represent k C , k D , and k S in order to allow complexity analyses of this input-output mapping to assess the effects of these quantities on the runtime of any algorithm that computes this mapping. As we are interested here in ideal observer models which specify the best possible solution behaviors under eRCT, we can eliminate all search operators before the final sequence of restructuring operators (as these served only to illustrate that preceding episodes of restructurings were insufficient to allow a solution). 4 This effectively results in a solution-producing operator sequence in which there is at most one initial sequence of restructuring operator applications followed by a sequence of search operator applications. This is specified as follows:
Problem Solving under erCT (ideal-beHavior verSion)
Input: Chunk-type set T, search-operator set O, problem representation p with chunk-structure D, constraint-set C = (C G , C O ), and integers k C , k D , and k S . Output: A sequence s consisting of the application of ≤ k C constraint relaxation and ≤ k D chunk decomposition operators followed by the application of ≤ k S search operators from O that transforms p into a goal state consistent with C G , if such an s exists, and special symbol ⊥ otherwise.
It is this second version that we will analyze in the remainder of the paper. This result establishes that there are no polynomial-time algorithms (and hence efficient ideal observer models) that can correctly compute this input-output mapping for all inputs, regardless of whether or not insight is involved, i.e., whether k C + k D > 0 or k C = k D = 0 respectively. Hence, restrictions must be assumed to apply to the input domain of Problem Solving under eRCT for the theory to be able to explain efficient solution of problems (whether or not this solving involves insight) by human beings.
In our parameterized complexity analyses, we consider the following three classes of restrictions (see Table 1 These results show that problem solving under eRCT cannot be done both efficiently and correctly under a number of restrictions. These results are much more powerful than they first appear, as it is known that an input-output mapping that is fp-intractable for a particular parameter set K is also fp-intractable relative to any subset of K (see Lemma 7 in Section A.2 in Appendix A). Hence, none of the parameters considered here can be either individually or in many combinations be restricted to yield efficient solvability of problems under eRCT.
Despite Again, these results are much more powerful than they first appear, as it is known that an input-output mapping that is fp-tractable for a particular parameter set K is also fp-tractable relative to any superset of K (see Lemma 6 in Section A.2 in Appendix A). Hence, any set of parameters including all of the parameters in any of the parameter sets in Results 5-7 above can be restricted to yield efficient solvability of problems under eRCT.
DISCUSSION
The general intractability of eRCT even when no insights are invoked, i.e., when k C = k D = 0 (Result 1), implies that the computational difficulty of eRCT is due to the underlying computational complexity inherent in problem space search. This has long been informally assumed in cognitive science (under the term "combinatorial problem space explosion") and was first shown formally in Sajedinia and Wareham (2014) (courtesy of the intractability of STRIPS, a planning system popular in AI that is based on Newell and Simon's General Problem Solver (Bylander, 1994) ). However, it is nonetheless sobering that the simpler case of problem space search embodied in our computational-level model of eRCT is also intractable. This also establishes formally that, contrary to the conjectures of some (Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2006; Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009 ), restructuring is not central to the intractability of eRCT.
What does, then, allow eRCT to be tractable and hence explain observed instances of human problem solving with Table 1 ) can be either individually or in many combinations be restricted to yield tractability. This renders incomplete additional explanations suggested by the results of experiments on human problem solving, e.g., that problem solving requiring insight becomes easier when either the number of constraint relaxations (k C ) (Knoblich et al., 1999 (Knoblich et al., , p. 1535 or the total number of constraints (C) (MacGregor & Cunningham, 2009, p. 133) are restricted.
Complete explanations are nonetheless close at hand. For example, though restricting {|D|, |C|, k C , k D } does not help, fp tractability and thus a provably complete explanation can be achieved if one in addition limits the opportunities for problem space search by also restricting {|p|, |O|, k S } (Result 5).
7 Once one such complete explanation is in hand, others can readily be derived by examining the mechanisms in the underlying fp algorithm and considering new parameters associated with those mechanisms. For example, the loose upper bounds in the derivation of the runtime of the algorithm underlying Result 5 suggest that restrictions on |p| and |D| may be too broad. Results 6 and 7 thus invoke alternate sets of parameters involving parameters |D A | and |O A | (which were not considered in the initial stages of the research reported here) that can be restricted to limit the degree of chunk decomposition and opportunities for problem space search in a tighter fashion. As only active chunks can be decomposed, |D| can be replaced with |D A | (which is potentially much smaller, e.g., 7 ± 2 (Simon, 1974) ); similarly, loose algorithm runtime bounds based on {|p|, |O|} can be replaced by tighter bounds based on |O A | (which is again potentially much smaller). Hence, as noted in Section 2, the parameter sets in Results 5-7 describe distinct but related classes of cognitive mechanisms that can potentially explain efficient problem solving under eRCT.
It must be stressed that such theoretical analyses are but part of the research process. Competing complete explanations should be evaluated against human behavior to see not only if the values of parameters in these explanations are in fact small in problems solved by human beings but also to determine if these parameters interact in the manner proposed by these explanations. This will of course involve the careful interpretation of the results of performed human experiments as well as the design and performance of new experiments, all of which will inform further theoretical analysis.
The required integration of theoretical analyses and experiments in such a research cycle is difficult, and a very important direction for future research.
It is tempting to think that the progressively more finegrained theoretical analyses illustrated above, and in particular the introduction of new and more refined parameters, can be carried out purely in the realm of algorithms. However, such new parameters must always first be evaluated for fp-intractability to assess the extent to which they can be exploited in fp algorithms and hence participate in complete explanations. For example, let |O I | be the maximum size (in terms of total number of objects and predicates) of any X or Y in any operator X → Y in O and |C L | be the maximum number of symbols of any constraint in C (where predicates count as single symbols). Both are plausible restrictions, as large search operators and/or constraints could conceivably be responsible for computational difficulty. However, it is easy to show that all of our intractability results hold under the following conditions:
• |O I | ≤ 3 (with each operator being restricted to modifying the type of a single predicate);
The last two of these are achieved by admittedly gross abuses of formalism (namely, collapsing the computations in a constraint and a set of constraints, respectively, into the internal computation of a single predicate). Such may not be psychologically allowable and should be forbidden in our computational-level model. However, note that such absurdities (and the complex interactions between model aspects underlying these absurdities) only become visible with access to detailed algorithmic models, which are best derived and examined using complexity-based analyses like the ones applied in this paper. This amply demonstrates the utility and necessity of these analyses in deriving complete explanations of the tractability of computational-level models.
A final and important caveat is appropriate at this time: our analyses are geared towards producing ideal observer models and associated complete explanations whose operation is strictly deterministic. This does not allow us to fully address issues associated with probabilistic and/or nonoptimal processing in problem solving, such as is introduced by problem space search heuristics like means-ends analysis or hill climbing (Ohlsson, 2011; Öllinger & Knoblich, 2009 ). However, this does not mean that our results have nothing to say about such matters. For example, the following is a consequence of Result 1.
Result 8. Problem Solving under eRCT is not solvable by a polynomial-time algorithm that operates correctly with probability ≥ 2/3. 8 Though perhaps too broad in scope, this is to our knowledge the first result to put formally provable limits on the
Processing in Problem Solving Involving Insight runtimes and achievable success rates of heuristic-based problem solving, regardless of whether or not insight is involved. It is our hope that, with the guidance of computationally minded researchers in the problem solving community, ongoing work on the computational complexity analysis of probabilistic cognitive models (e.g., Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, Wareham, & van Rooij, 2013 ) and probabilistic parameterized complexity (e.g., Kwisthout, 2015; Montoya & Muller, 2013) can be extended to provide additional results that are of more direct relevance.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have illustrated how computational complexity analysis can used to derive ideal observer models for theories of problem solving as well as provably complete explanations for situations in which such models are computationally tractable. In particular, we have (1) shown that several proposed explanations of what makes problem solving possible under eRCT are incomplete and (2) derived several new explanations that are complete. It is our hope that the techniques shown here will aid problem solving researchers in planning and interpreting the results of their experiments as well as formulating new and more accurate computationally based models of problem solving.
NOTES
1 This paper is a revision and expansion of results originally presented without proof by the author in a 2011 talk given at Dagstuhl Workshop 11351 (Resource-bounded Problem Solving) and a poster abstract presented at ICCM 2012 (Wareham, 2012) . 2 An alternative statement of completeness of an explanation relative to a set of constraints K as defined here is that a complete explanation E of the tractability of some cognitive ability A relative to K implies that (1) an algorithm for A whose tractability is explained by restrictions of K is possible and (2) this algorithm potentially explains how people do A. Conversely, if an explanation E is incomplete then no such algorithm is possible and E cannot explain how people do A. In this light, our computational complexity analysis approach can be seen as being analogous to Newell and Simon's "sufficiency proofs" approach, in which an explanation E of A is implemented as a program (Newell & Simon, 1972) . If that program runs in a manner consistent with human performance, then E is a potential explanation of A; otherwise, it cannot explain how people do A. 3 Constraint mechanisms have also been invoked to explain other aspects of problem solving, e.g., how people learn from errors during skill practice (Ohlsson, 1996) . 4 It could be argued that the eliminated search operators are necessary because they establish the need for (and may even in some way affect the choice of) the overall set of restructurings needed to achieve solution. However, until some formalizable manner is proposed by which the initial search operators so influence the overall set of restructurings, the best possible sequences of search and restructuring operators to achieve solution in an ideal observer model of eRCT are of the form described here. 5 This claim follows from our NP-hardness proof for Problem Solving under eRCT (see Section A.3 in Appendix A) and the conjecture, widely believed within computer science (Fortnow, 2009; Garey & Johnson, 1979) and cognitive science (van Rooij, 2008) , that P ≠ NP. 6 These claims follow from our W[1]-hardness proofs for Problem Solving under eRCT (see Section A.3 in Appendix A) and the conjecture, widely believed within computer science (Downey & Fellows, 1999) 
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF RESULTS
In order to prove tractability and intractability results for the model of problem solving given in Section 3, we must fully formalize the various entities mentioned in this model. Hence, in this appendix, we first give the formal details of our computational-level model of eRCT (Section A.1). This is followed by a brief summary of techniques for establishing polynomial-time and fixed-parameter intractability (Section A.2) and the proofs of the various intractability and tractability results presented in Section 4 (Section A.3).
A.1. FORMALIZATION OF REPRESENTATION CHANGE THEORY
In this section, we will give the details of our formalizations for the various entities described in our computational-level model of eRCT given in Section 3. Much of this formalization will build on the formalization of predicate-structures and analogical matching of these structures given in van Rooij, Evans, Muller, Gedge, and Wareham (2008) . A problem representation consists of a collection of entities and their relationships, a collection of chunks imposed on this collection, and a subset of those chunks comprising the currently active chunks. We model entity-relationship collections as predicate-structures. Following van , predicate-structures are formalized as a restricted type of vertex-and edge-labelled directed acyclic graph. 
∊ A}. A concept graph is ordered if all of its internal vertices are ordered; otherwise, if it contains at least one unordered predicate, it is unordered. Note that in a concept graph, internal vertices correspond to predicates or functions, leaves correspond to objects, and the labelings λ Ρ , λ Β , and λ Α assign predicate-types, object-names, and predicate argument-order labels, respectively. A chunk-type corresponds to a predicate-structure, a chunk-instance is the portion of a predicate-structure exactly matched by a chunk-type under analogy-morphism as formalized in van Rooij et al. (2008) , and a chunk-structure for a predicate-structure p is a set of possibly overlapping but non-nested chunk-instances that collectively cover all objects in p. Note that the chunkinstances in a chunk-structure of a predicate-structure need not include all predicates in that predicate-structure.
A search operator is a substructure replacement rule of the form X → Y, where X and Y are predicate-structures with associated chunk-structures. An application of such an operator to a predicate-structure p involves the exact matching via analogy morphism of X and its associated chunk-structure to a sub-predicate-structure of P and the subsequent replacement of X with Y. Changes made by rules are restricted such that the transformation from X to Y can only move chunks in the chunk-structure of X or add, delete, or modify predicates in the structure linking chunks in, but not contained in, the chunk-structure of X. In the remainder of this appendix, we further restrict search operators such that they cannot move chunks and may only modify the types of predicates attached to but not included in chunks; as such, they correspond to the predicate-structure re-representation rules described in Wareham, Robere, and van Rooij (2012) .
A constraint is a formula in first-order logic whose basic elements are Boolean predicates defined over the objects, predicates, and chunks in a problem representation. Each of these predicates is polynomial-time computable and returns True if a particular structure exists in a problem representation and False otherwise. In the remainder of this appendix, we restrict a constraint to consist of a single Boolean predicate.
Finally, the application of a constraint relaxation operator corresponds to the removal of one of the constraints in C G ∪ C O and the application of a chunk decomposition operator corresponds to the replacement of a chunk x in a chunk-structure D by a set of one or more possibly overlapping but non-nested chunks that cover at least those objects covered by x that are not covered by the other chunks in D.
A.2. PROVING INTRACTABILITY
Given some criterion of tractability like polynomial-time or fixed-parameter solvability, we can define the class T of all input-output mappings that are tractable relative to that criterion. For example, T could be the class P of decision problems (see below) solvable in polynomial-time, or FPT, the class of parameterized problems that are fp-tractable. We can show that a particular input-output mapping is not in T (and thus that this mapping is intractable) by showing that this mapping is at least as hard as the hardest input-output mapping in any mapping class C that properly includes (or is strongly conjectured to properly include) T. For example, C could be NP, the class of decision problems whose candidate solutions can be verified in polynomial time, or a class of parameterized problems in the W-hierarchy = {W[1], T. Wareham Processing in Problem Solving Involving Insight to the endpoints v and v j , respectively, of e in G. In addition, let there be |V| single-argument predicate of type t′ such that each object is the argument of one of these predicates. The predicates of type t and t′ will be referred to as edgeand vertex-predicates, respectively. Note that C′(G) is an extension of the transformation C(G) defined in the Supplementary Materials of van .
Lemma 8. Clique polynomial-time many-one reduces to ordered Problem Solving under eRCT such that in the constructed instance of ordered Problem Solving under eRCT, k C = k D = 0 and k S , |C|, and |O| are functions of k from the given instance of Clique.
Proof: Given an instance
of ordered Problem Solving under eRCT:
• p = C′(G);
• T is the set consisting of chunk-type c 1 which encloses individual objects; • D is the chunk-structure consisting of all |V| chunkinstances of type c 1 in C′(G);
selection search operator that takes a c 1 -enclosed object and its associated vertex-predicate of type t′ and changes the type of that vertex-predicate to t i ; To prove that this construction is a reduction, we must show that the answer to the given instance of Clique is "Yes" if and only if the answer to the constructed instance of Problem Solving under eRCT is "Yes". We will do this by proving both directions of this implication separately:
(⇒) If the answer to the given instance of Clique is "Yes", there is a k-clique in G. Let p′ be the concept graph created by applying k of the operators in O to objects in p corresponding to the vertices in the k-clique in G such that the resulting objects have vertex-predicates of type t i that are in the same ascending order as the arbitrary order on V assumed in C′ (G) . Observe that this p′ and D satisfy all constraint-predicates in C G , which means that the answer to the constructed instance of Problem Solving under eRCT is "Yes".
(⇐) Conversely, if the answer to the constructed instance of Problem Solving under eRCT is "Yes", each of the k = k S search operators in O can be applied to p to create a p′ and D such that all of the constraint-predicates in C G are satisfied. By the specification of O and C G , this implies that there is a k-clique in G, which means that the answer to the given instance of Clique is "Yes".
This completes the proof. Lemma 9. Clique polynomial-time many-one reduces to ordered Problem Solving under eRCT such that in the constructed instance of ordered Problem Solving under eRCT, k C = 0, k D = k and k S , |C|, |O|, and |O A | are functions of k from the given instance of Clique.
Proof: Consider a modified version of the reduction in Lemma 8 in which k D = k and the chunk-structure D has an additional |V| chunks of type c 2 , one enclosing each vertexobject and its associated vertex-predicate. In this reduction, vertex-selection in p now requires both the decomposition of a chunk of type c 2 and the application of the appropriate vertex-selection search operator o i . The proof of correctness of this reduction is analogous to that for Lemma 8. To complete the proof, note that as at most k D = k objects can be decomposed at any time and at most |O| = k operators can be applied to each of these decomposed objects, |O A | ≤ k × k = k • p = C′(K k );
• T is the set consisting of chunk-type c 1 which encloses individual objects; • D is the chunk-structure consisting of all |V| = k chunk-instances of type c 1 in C′(K k ); • O consists of the following two sets of search operators:
1. vertex-selection operators {vs 1 , vs 2 ,… vs |V| }, where vs i takes a c 1 -enclosed object and its associated vertex-predicate of type t′ and changes the type of that vertex-predicate to t i ; and 2. edge-check operators {ec 1 , ec 2 ,… ec |E| }, where ec i takes an edge-predicate linking c 1 -enclosed objects whose associated vertex-predicates have types corresponding to the endpoints of e i in G and changes the type of that edge-predicate to t′′;
T. Wareham Processing in Problem Solving Involving Insight
• C G is the set of k(k − 1)/2 predicates {isValid (1,2) (p), ischunk-subset. As there are at most such chunk-subsets, |O A | < |O| × |D A |
|DA|+1
, and the result follows by the algorithm given in the proof for Result 6.
Result 8. If P = BPP and Problem Solving under eRCT is polynomial-time tractable by an algorithm which operates correctly with probability ≥ 2/3 then P = NP.
Proof: It is widely believed that P = BPP (Wigderson, 2007, Section 5.2) where BPP is considered the most inclusive class of problems that can be efficiently solved using probabilistic methods (in particular, methods whose probability of correctness is ≥ 2/3 and can be efficiently boosted to be arbitrarily close to probability one). Hence, if Problem Solving under eRCT has a polynomial-time algorithm which operates correctly with probability ≥ 2/3 and hence is in BPP = P, then by Result 1 and the definition of NP-hardness we know that P = NP.
